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ABSTRACT Introduction: This article deals with the Supreme Federal Court’s empowerment trajectory, exploring exogenous variables
in order to explain what made the Supreme Court so institutionally powerful, and how it happened. After the classic studies on the
global expansion of the judicial power, that pointed to a myriad of causes as a result of the phenomenon, several recent researches
have indicated the political-party fragmentation as the main cause of judicial empowerment. Seeking to corroborate these analyses,
the present work analyzes the institutional empowerment of the Brazilian Judiciary from 1945 to 2015, testing the hypothesis the
greater the party fragmentation, more institutional power the STF holds. Materials and Methods: As a dependent variable, a synthetic
indicator was created to measure the institutional power of the Federal Supreme Court year by year. The independent variables mea-
sure the party composition of the Chamber of Deputies annually for the same period. In addition to these variables, other measures
were imported from the V-Dem database. For this analysis, simple linear, generalized linear and multinomial models were used. Re-
sults: We identified significant impact of party fragmentation on institutional empowerment of the Supreme Court. In all tests, party
fragmentation increased the chances of institutional empowerment of the Brazilian judiciary. Discussion: The exogenous reforms that
generated this empowerment took place with the support of the Executive and the leniency of the Legislative, transforming the Brazil-
ian Supreme Court into the Queen of the Chess.
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I. Introduction1
During the development and improvement of modern democracies, at-tention was focused on Representative Power. The Legislative Bodyhas always been the vector of legitimacy and sovereignty, that is, the
apex of the very idea of democratic government. Since the incremental reforms
in the English model, there has been an increasing improvement in Parliament,
whose power was gradually shared with the Monarchy until its current institu-
tional design, under the aegis of the principle of parliament’s sovereignty, that
is, the Legislative has the last word.
In contrast to the British model, Madison developed a system of checks and
balances where the Legislative would be separate from the Executive and
judges allocated in a higher court would control the other powers through the
exegetical application of the Constitution. In other words, the sovereignty of the
parliament would give way to the supremacy of the constitution. Under the
aegis of this principle, Madison and Hamilton, with a strong participation of the
American Supreme Court itself2, designed a model that gave the Judiciary the
last word in the decision-making process, through judicial review. The common
law system itself contributed to the establishment of the American Supreme
Court, and, especially after the Marbury v. Madison case, the limits and scope of
its activities within the framework of the other powers’ act review.
This model of control by judges proved to be quite effective and widespread
in the period after the second war, because it was able to inhibit the majority
DOI 10.1590/1678-987320287307en
Rev. Sociol. Polit., v. 28, n. 73, e007, 2020
Original Articles
1This research was supported
by Nacional Council for
Scientific and Technological




CAPES. We thank the
anonymous reviewers of the
Revista de Sociologia e
Política for their comments on
this article.
2See the exemplary decision of
that Court in the Marbury v.
Madison case.
passions, preventing dangerous, but legislatively majority politicians, from
gaining power, as in the case of Germany in the Nazi period. Thus, the classic
collection by Tate & Vallinder (1995) was the first academic effort aimed at un-
derstanding the causes and consequences of this process, which had gained
global dimensions. In other words, with regards to Western democracies, par-
liamentarians were no longer the last word in the decision-making process,
more and more judges were playing a central role in this dynamic. It is a seg-
ment with strong political and social ascension, specially selected to compose a
judicial body with special competence3.
Brazil followed this global movement of Judiciary expansion and by 1988,
in its constitutional design, combined two models of judicial review, the Ameri-
can model and the concentrated Kelsenian model, which in the original design
was exercised by an administrative body outside the three powers, but in Brazil
it ended up in the hands of the same body that was responsible for the North
American type of review. This is how the current Supreme Federal Court (STF)4
emerged. However, this model did not appear randomly or accidentally. The na-
tional record of democratic disruptions and political instability would play a
major role in empowering our supreme court5. The main question of this re-
search is directed to how and why the Supreme Court became so powerful. Who
provided the STF with more power, the Executive or the Legislative? What ef-
fect does the political regime have on this increase in power? The main hypothe-
sis is that political party fragmentation has made the Legislative and Executive
endow the STF with sufficient power to protect elites who leave power, as well
as avoid congressional gridlocks, endowing the supreme court with the capacity
to resolve decision impasses in order to guarantee the fluidity of the political
system, removing decision paralysis.
To test these hypotheses, a database was set up comprehending the years be-
tween 1945 and 2015, where each year is an event and in which seventeen exog-
enous variables are measured, among which we highlight five indicators of
institutional empowerment of the STF and the Judiciary, three measures for
party fragmentation through the effective number of parties (NEP - from the
term in Portuguese “Número Efetivo de Partidos”), the minimum number of
parties to implement constitutional change (NMP - from the term in Portuguese
“Número Mínimo de Partidos”) and the Douglas Rae fractionalization index
(F)6, as well as two variables of political competition (polyarchy and political
competition) and a control binary variable for political regime. Interactive terms
were also created to capture the marginal effects of the regime. Thus, the article
is divided into three sections, after that introduction (I). In the second section,
we go through a brief analysis of the evolution of the judiciary in general, and in
Brazil in particular. In the third section we return to the institutional debate and
explore the data, and in the fourth one we run the models and deliver the analy-
sis. Finally, we bring the conclusions (V) and final considerations.
II. Summary of the Evolution of the Judiciary Power
In the year 1752, Montesquieu recorded within three powers the Judiciary
is, to some extent, close to nothing. His work, the classic The Spirit of the Laws,
would become a landmark in the theory of the separation of powers. In fact,
Judges did not occupy a prominent place in the construction of models of de-
mocracy, either in Classical Antiquity or in the post-absolutism period. Not
even James Madison in his federalist articles had thought of giving the Supreme
Court so much prominence, which, in his institutional design, operated as a
mechanism for checks and balances within the federative-presidential logic of
the North American model. It was a set of judicial decisions7 that built, through
precedent, the strength that the American Constitutional Court started to exert
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over other powers. These cases were seminal, not only to reinforce checks-
and-balances, but also to illustrate the Supreme Court as a policy maker, as out-
lined in Robert Dahl’s seminal article (Dahl 1957).
While the diffuse North American judicial review model found a favorable
environment in the common law system, which allows the Judiciary to innovate
in Law through the rule of precedent, the civil law model required a positive in-
stitutional design through the Legislative, which in a way prevented the Judi-
ciary from self-empowerment. It was in 1920, in Austria, that Hans Kelsen and
Carl Schmitt had an intense debate8 about the adoption of a model of judicial in-
tervention that was not as strong as the one of the United States. So the concen-
trated-ABSTRACT model emerged in Austria, where a body outside the
Judiciary, but holding last word on the Constitution, would have as its main pre-
rogative to protect it from conjunctural majorities, seeking to provide legal sta-
bility over time. However, this debate only gained worldwide proportions after
the Second World War, when European nations found themselves weakened by
the Sovereignty of Parliament principle9, and sought a model that would protect
them from populism and from the appropriate legislative majorities. From then
on, the Madisonian institutional design enshrined the Principle of Supremacy of
the Constitution, which started to be adopted by several European and Latin
American countries. In other words, the Judiciary Power came to be seen within
the three powers as a factor of stability against legislative majorities that tended
to tyranny of the majority.
This new configuration in the theory of separation of powers endowed the
Judiciary with a role previously unheard of, which, by strengthening institu-
tionally the body through constitutional rules, allowed Judges to start to inter-
fere with more force and frequency in the political arena. As Lijphart (2003, p.
258) pointed out, if a body is created with the sole purpose of examining the
constitutionality of the legislation, it is very likely that it will perform this task
with some vitality. The Brazilian case is even more interesting, since its su-
preme court, the Supreme Federal Court - STF, is not a body with a single aim
in analyze the constitutionality of norms and rules. He also acts as an ordinary
appellate body in cases where he is the original body for actions against cer-
tain public authorities, in addition to assessing extraordinary appeals, where
he exercises diffuse judicial review and also acts as a concentrated judicial re-
viewer. In other words, the Brazilian model is a hybrid model that united the
North American model and the Kelsen model. However, this model was built
over time, gradually and incrementally. The STF was not always so powerful,
as demonstrated by Aliomar Baleeiro in the work “O Supremo Tribunal Fed-
eral, esse outro desconhecido” (The Supreme Federal Court, this other un-
known), published in 1968 (Baleeiro 1968). The Graph 1 illustrates this
evolution over time. The y-axis represents the number of words contained in
the section dedicated to the Judiciary in each Constitution by presidential
mandates (x-axis) due to the changes made by constitutions and constitutional
amendments. Thus, it was possible to capture the “size” of each of the three
powers, allowing their comparison. The graph shows that the year 2004 (Lula
2003-2010) was the moment when the Judiciary (black line) overtook the
Legislative (red line). The Executive is represented by the blue line. It was in
that year that there was a reform of the judiciary (Amendment 45 of 2004),
with the creation of the National Justice Council, making the control of the
central Judiciary to become even stronger.
In addition to the reform of the Judiciary, Andrei Koerner stressed that Pres-
ident Lula, upon assuming the Presidency of the Republic in 2003, had difficul-
ties in implementing his agenda through the Legislative route, opting for the
judicial route when appointing progressive ministers linked to the left and social
movements (Koerner, 2013). This argument is well illustrated in Graph 2, with
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the alignment of the indicators10 of judicial empowerment and party fragmenta-
tion. These indicators were constructed through the factor analysis of six vari-
ables in two blocks: 1) judicial empowerment, where the variables that measure
the size of the Judiciary Power in the Constitution through the number of words
(NPPJ), the degree of detail of the constitutional text related to the Judiciary (D)
and the STF Empowerment Indicator (iSTF11); 2) party fragmentation, in which
the variables of the effective number of parties (NEP), the Rae fractionalization
index (F) and the minimum number of parties were implemented to implement a
constitutional change (NMP). For more details, see Barbosa (2015, p. 63-98).
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Graph 1 - Branches’ Evolution (1891 – 2014)
Source: The authors, based on Barbosa 2015.
Graph 2 - Indicator of Judicial Empowerment and Party Fragmentation between 1945
and 2013.
10For more details, see
Barbosa (2015, pp. 63-98).
11This indicator will be further
detailed below, in the
methodology section.
In the Graph 2, the y-axis is represented by the factored indicators, while the
x-axis represents the year of constitutional changes (by Constitution and by
amendments). The red dotted line signifies the point of no return, that is, after
the 1988 Constitution there is no way for the Executive and/or Legislative to go
back and diminish the powers of the Judiciary, unless it agrees with this reduc-
tion, which is very unlikely. Once the STF is in charge of controlling constitu-
tional changes, any attempt to reduce its power through a Constitutional
Amendment will be up to it to decide on its own reduction of power. This event
specifically shows that, within the current constitutional order, it is the STF that
decides on its own powers, being responsible for making a self-restraint
(Graph 1 shows that there is no reduction of power after 1988). The gray dotted
line, on the other hand, illustrates Koerner’s 2013 argument, exactly when the
indicators of party fragmentation and judicial empowerment are aligned over
time. This alignment suggests an extremely strong correlation between party
fragmentation and judicial empowerment.
The 1988 Constitution ignored Kelsen’s concern to create a judiciary as
powerful as that of the United States. And it went further, incorporating a softer
model, but which in the Brazilian institutional design became extremely strong,
since in Kelsen’s conception, concentrated control should be exercised by an
administrative body outside the three powers and not by the Judiciary, as it is in
Brazil. Thus, the Brazilian model makes the Federal Supreme Court (from a
prescriptive-normative point of view) an institutionally extremely powerful
body. However, having the institutional power to act does not guarantee it will
do so (contrary to Lijphart’s argument). As in national model the Judiciary is in-
ert, it is necessary that other bodies first provoke it. And these demands have in
fact been gaining strength as the STF responds to them with what jurists call ju-
dicial activism.
But what makes an elected political power to allow an unelected power to
interfere with its actions in such a define way? Why does the Legislative and/or
Executive endow the Judiciary with such strong institutional power (normative
power)?
II.1 Political Uncertainty and the Insurance Model
John Ferejohn (2002) uses the Madisonian institutional design to argue that
the political space used for political criticism and contestation can suffer vari-
ous forms of abuse in order to threaten the very operationalization of democ-
racy. According to Ferejohn
Madison insisted that the spirit of faction can be dangerous to liberty and there-
fore, ultimately, to democracy. He also recognized, however, that in a republic,
factions and parties, which serve to further both public and private interests, can-
not be abolished without undermining republican government itself. At best, the
politics of faction and party can be regulated or managed to limit the likely
abuses. The most satisfactory form of regulation relies on the electoral process to
correct political pathology. Of course, if democratic self-regulation fails, there
are court-enforced constitutional safeguards that may be employed to limit abu-
sive lawmaking (Ferejohn 2002, p. 50)12.
Ferejohn argues that, in contrast to the previous argument, the law or its ap-
plication must occur within courts. Its application is controversial, but it is to be
expected that in most cases, it is a technical matter of finding the correct princi-
ples under which the dispute is established. The duty of judges is to promote fair
and non-biased courts before conflicting political parties can settle their dis-
putes under previously established legal rules (Ferejohn 2002, p. 50). This
model, continues Ferejohn, sees the courts as places where specific disputes are
fought, not as an arena where general regulations are formulated. In other
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words, a Supreme Court as an effective mechanism to prevent the tyranny of the
majority or popular passions, as Jon Elster (2000, p. 156) pointed out, would be-
come just one of its functions. Ferejohn offers two responses to this increase in
the scope of the Judiciary (judicialization of politics).
The first refers to the increase in the fragmentation of power within political
powers, which limits the ability to legislate, or to be the place where public poli-
cies can be effectively formulated, that is, what Ferejohn calls the fragmentation
hypothesis: when political powers cannot act, people who seek to resolve their
conflicts will tend to gravitate towards institutions that can deliver solutions.
The institutions that can offer this solution are the courts, especially where the
legislature is divided (Ferejohn 2002, p. 55). The second concerns the expecta-
tion that some courts can be trusted to protect a wide range of important values
against potential political abuse. This is the legal hypothesis.
But what leads the constituents to include in the constitutional text judicial
review mechanisms, capable of reviewing future legislative acts? According to
Ginsburg (2003, pp. 24-25), this depends on the positions of power of the con-
stituents in post-constitutional governments, and the key factor they take into
account is the uncertainty, at the moment of constitutional construction, of the
future configuration policy. Ginsburg outlines two extreme scenarios that rein-
force this argument. The first concerns a one-party scenario, where there are
very few incentives to establish a neutral arbitrator to resolve disputes. The sec-
ond concerns a scenario of many political forces, where no party is confident
that it will remain in power in the next elections. When political forces are dead-
locked or dispersed, no party can predict who will win the elections after the im-
plementation of the Constitution. In other words, if there is no political party
confident in the possibility of electoral victory, they will all prefer to limit the
majority, and later, they will value minority institutions, such as judicial review.
Ginsburg called this reasoning an insurance model of judicial review. In other
words, the judicial review operates as an insurance policy against impasses and
dispersions of political parties in the decision-making arena.
The literature that addresses the theme of institutional construction points to
other explanatory forms of this phenomenon (Ingram 2015). Despite the
strength of the insurance model, which has a strong influence in countries of re-
cent transition, as is the case in Brazil, it must be recognized that it is not sover-
eign. It is feasible to point out flaws in the argument that declining elites would
have the strength to empower institutions in order to minimally preserve their
interests (Ingram 2016). “Likewise, the argument centered on the uncertainty
arising from the increase in electoral competition is not able to explain the tim-
ing and content of these reforms” (Da Ros 2017, p. 61).
The so-called internal actors (members of the Judiciary) can also play a fun-
damental role in the formulation of these changes. They directly benefit from
the strengthening of the courts, including, in some cases, overcoming the
strength of the declining elites (Couso et. al. 2010). Although we recognize the
relevance and importance of competing theoretical explanations, we insist that,
for the Brazilian case, the evidence of the insurance model gains prominence in
the works that deepened the modus operandi of constitutional building.
The influence of so-called legal actors in the process of achieving the Con-
stitution is a peaceful point within Brazilian literature. However, this does not
mean that there were no mediations built during the manufacturing process of
the Constitution. In this case, the PMDB party was strongly favored by the prin-
ciple of party proportionality, since, in addition to having the majority of the
constituents (54,20% of the total), it had in its favor a flexible principle for the
occupation of prominent positions. The eight reporting roles of the commis-
sions were occupied by PMDB members, in flagrant disregard for the principle
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melhor das hipóteses, as
políticas das facções e dos
partidos podem ser reguladas
ou dirigidas de forma a limitar
a probabilidade de abusos. A
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regulação reside no processo
eleitoral para corrigir
patologias políticas. É claro
que, caso as autorregulações
democráticas falhem, há os
tribunais constitucionalmente
empoderados como
salvaguarda que pode ser
empregada para limitar abusos
no processo legislativo.
(Ferejohn, 2002, p. 50,
translated by the authors)
of party proportionality. In addition, PMDB was responsible for the reporting in
thirteen subcommittees and for the chairmanship of another fifteen.
Without going too far into the issues of the 1988 Constituent process, it is
clear that the elite that negotiated the transition was not the decadent one.
PMDB was the main opposition party to the regime and birthed all negotiations
related to society’s pressure groups (Coelho 1999). This was no different in the
case of judicial empowerment.
If during the constituency there were no major difficulties in converging the
Madisonian and Kelsenian models of control over normative acts, the subse-
quent period also did not show any difficulties. Since the Ginsburg argument is
for periods of constitutional building, it is in constitutional changes that most at-
tention resides, since, as Melo 2007 said, it is not difficult to modify the Consti-
tution, so the argument gains strength not only at each constitutional period , but
with each amendment that modified the Judiciary itself. From 1891 to 2013
there were 29 modifications, seven by constitutions and 22 via constitutional
amendments. Within these 22 amendments, ten (45,5%) were authored by the
Legislative and twelve (54,5%) were authored by the Executive (all exoge-
nous). The following graph illustrates the increase in the Judiciary’s power
from 1891 to 2015.
It is evident that democratic governments contributed much more to the
slope of the adjustment line than dictatorial governments (as illustrated in the
Graph 3), which corroborates Ginsburg’s argument. This will be made even
clearer in section 4, where the data will provide even more robust responses. So
far, both Ginsburg and Ferejohn have made a solid contribution to formulating
the hypothesis that the greater the party fragmentation, the greater the empow-
erment of the judiciary.
III. Methodology, methods and data
The institutional changes implemented by the constitutions and their re-
spective amendments were not random or bequeathed to chance, they were the
result of a strategic calculation that took into account the very trajectory of the
Brazilian political system. The institutional aspect is pressing in this analysis,
since it analyzes what the institutions do, how they maintain themselves and
how the actors behave. There are, therefore, two perspectives under which one
takes into account, first a strategic calculation and second, the cultural aspects.
Hall & Taylor (2003) argue that the individual’s behavior is never entirely
strategic, being limited by his worldview, that is, for culturalists individuals
seek more satisfaction than optimization. The perspective of strategic calcula-
tion goes in the opposite direction, showing that institutions are maintained
because they do something close to the Nash Equilibrium. Historical
institutionalists, on the other hand, work with both perspectives when dealing
with the relationship between institutions and action. According to Victória
Hattam (1993), the difference between institutional contexts has a direct im-
pact on power relations.
III.1 Creation of the iSTF indicator
We adopted the dependent variable iSTF, developed by Barbosa 201513,
which is an indicator based on Shugart & Carey (1992) - who created an index
of institutional powers for the President of the Republic from two dimensions,
one is the power to legislate and the other concerns non-legislative powers, on a
scale from zero (weak) to 4 (strong), in each dimension. Therefore, the depend-
ent variable iSTF, can be represented by the following formula: iSTF = p(AA) +
j(gAP), the term p means the active procedural capacity, that is, the ability to act
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13For iSTF, Barbosa 2015
chose not to establish a scale,
but to maintain a counting
pattern, mainly due to the
generalized linear models,
being the most appropriate
scale for the negative binomial
model, as shown by Nelder &
Wedderburn (1972).
by provoking an author with procedural legitimacy active AA14. The term j
means the prerogative of judging actors constitutionally authorized to appear on
the passive pole, whether in a group or individually gAP15. This way, the agents
that can sue are counted, together with the agents that can be sued, forming a set
of institutional powers that authorize the STF to act in the most varied scenarios,
as in diffuse/concentrated control and even in originary actions against public
authorities , such as the President of the Republic, Parliamentarians and the
highest echelons of the Cabinet. This indicator, therefore, measures the judicial
empowerment of the Supreme Federal Court.
III.2 Description, Sources and Measurement of Variables
In addition to the iSTF, we highlight two independent variables, henceforth
exogenous, to capture party fragmentation: Effective Number of Parties in the
Chamber of Deputies (NEP), and the Minimum Number of Parties (NMP) to
implement a constitutional change (as an alternative to NEP) . This measure was
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Note: The variable used on the x-axis of Graph 3 is the number of words of the judiciary (NPPJ), and the y-axis represents
25-year intervals, with the mandates of the presidents of the republic highlighted within the image. Thus, it is possible to show
under which presidents there was a greater inclination in the empowerment of the judiciary through the number of words as a
proxy for judicial empowerment.
Graph 3 - Dispersion of Judiciary’s Number of Words by Presidential Mandate between 1891 and 2015.
created by Negretto 2013, to capture the exact number of parties with influence
to implement constitutional changes, a situation that the NEP does not capture.
In this sense, Negretto proposes the NMP as the size of the “reform coalition”: a
discrete variable indicating the minimum number of parties necessary to form a
coalition able to pass constitutional amendments. For him,
If one party controls 75 percent of the seats, the minimum number of parties to
pass constitutional changes will be one, whether under absolute or qualified ma-
jority. If, however, the constituent body is composed of five parties sharing, say,
49, 16, 13, 12 and 10 percent of the seats, the minimum number of parties re-
quired to pass constitutional changes is either two or three depending on whether
the decision rule is absolute or two-thirds (Negretto 2013, p. 85)16.
Thus, both NEP and NMP will be considered independent variables and
used separately, since there is a strong correlation between them, which gener-
ates multicollinearity if they are present in the same model. In addition to these
variables, we also use others based on Linzer & Staton 2015 and some from the
Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) dataset. The relationships between variables
are described below. The first four variables are dependent, the first being the
iSTF indicator followed by Linzer & Staton 2015 variables. The variables after
the NEP are the independent ones and seek to measure political party fragmen-
tation (NEP, NMP, F, Polyarchy and Political Competition). These last two
were extracted from the Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) dataset for the years
under analysis. Regime is a binary variable measured to determine democratic
(1) and authoritarian (0) periods, facilitating the creation of interactive terms ca-
pable of showing the marginal effect of political and party fragmentation in
such periods. The iSTF synthetic indicator measures the number of prerogatives
that the Federal Supreme Court has had over time, ranging from diffuse control
of constitutionality to the concentrate, through the number of actors that can
trigger such a judicial review mechanism, as well as by the authorities subject to
Supreme Court, seeking to measure its institutional power17. The variable LJI18
stands for Latent Judicial Independence and seeks to measure a unified measure
for two hundred countries from 1948 to 2015 (Linzer & Staton 2015, p. 224).
The XCONST variable is based on the Polity IV project and was designed to
measure the extent to which decisions constrain the executive’s discretionary
power (Linzer & Staton 2015, p. 226). For statistical purposes, we recalculate
this variable and create the variable XCONST_cat, an ordinal variable of three
categories: weak (0 to 2), medium (3 and 4) and strong (5 and 6). The Polyarchy
variable19 (v2x_polyarchy) is an indicator that measures five components:
“elected incumbents”, “free and fair elections”, “freedom of expression”, “free-
dom of association” and “inclusive citizenship” (Teorel et. al. 2016, p. 2). It is
intuitive to say that the higher the level of Polyarchy, the greater the level of po-
litical competition, and the greater the level of uncertainty due to party fragmen-
tation, leading to judicial empowerment as a way of guaranteeing the limits of
the political game. Finally, we used an exclusive variable for political competi-
tion (e_polcomp) from the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et. al. 2017a). The fol-
lowing tables (Table 1) show the statistical descriptions of the variables used.
The period of anylisis is from 1945 to 2015, with the exception of Linzer &
Staton (2015) variables, which are only available from 1948 to 2015, and the
political competition variable, from V-DEM, which begins in 1946. In addition
to the variables described in Table 2, we also used others from the V-Dem
dataset, such as the Judicial Constraints on Executive Index (v2x_jucon) as well
as the variables used for its calculation such as compliance with judiciary
(v2jucomp), compliance with high court (v2juhccomp), high court Independ-
ence index (v2juhcind), and lower court Independence index (v2juncind).
These indicators also measure the strength of the Judiciary. It was necessary to
measure the relationship that the variables have among themselves, in order to
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14These actors with proc These
actors with active procedural
capacity are listed in art. 103
of the Federal Constitution of
Brazil, and they are: I – the
President of the Republic; II –
the directing board of the
Federal Senate; III – the
directing board of the
Chamber of Deputies; IV – the
Directing Board of a State
Legislative Assembly or of the
Federal District Legislative
Chamber; V – a State
Governor or the Federal
District Governor; VI – the
Attorney-General of the
Republic; VII – the Federal
Council of the Brazilian Bar
Association; VIII – a political
party represented in the
National Congress; IX – a
confederation of labour unions
or a professional association of
a nationwide nature.
15Here are counted all the
authorities that can be tried by
the STF, as stated in the
Federal Constitution of Brazil.
16In Portuguese: Se um partido
controla 75% das cadeiras, o
número mínimo de partidos
para aprovar mudanças
constitucionais será um, seja
maioria absoluta ou
qualificada. Entretanto, se a
Casa Legislativa é composta
por cinco partidos
compartilhando 49, 16, 13, 12
e 10% das cadeiras, o número
mínimo de partidos requerido
para aprovar mudanças na
Constituição será dois ou três,
a depender da regra de
emendamento (Negretto 2013,
p. 85, translated by the
authors)
17The institutional power here
is understood as Barbosa
(2015) proposed, that is, it is a
power described in the rules of
the game (precisely the
Constitution), it is not a power
utilized (whose variables
would not be institutional, but
decisional, analyzing the
decisions of the court). More
specifically, it is a de jure
power, that is, of being able to
act. And the power to act
interferes in the calculation
that legislative actors make
when making decisions, within
the decision-making process.
18For a more detailed
explanation see Linzer &
Staton (2015, p. 225).
19For a more detailed
explanation, see Coppedge et.
avoid multicollinearity problems and to evaluate the use of a factor analysis to
use transformed variables in order to reduce the number of variables used. On
the next tables are the correlation matrices between the variables (Tables 2 e 3).
The first five variables were collected from the Varieties of Democracy
(V-DEM) dataset for the period 1945-2015, measuring independence and judi-
cial strength in constraining the Executive. As they are extremely correlated
with each other, it is more appropriate to reduce them to a single factor through
factor analysis. We will call this unique factor the Judicial Indicator from
V-DEM. In the other independent variables (NEP, NMP, F, Polyarchy and Po-
litical Competition), which have already been previously explained, it is possi-
ble to verify an extremely high and significant correlation (except for the
Fragmentation Indicator, which is the result of the factor analysis and carries a
high load of variance of all other independent variables). In other words, the
one-factor factorial analysis proved to be quite right to aggregate this informa-
tion and facilitate a single model of ordinary least squares – OLS. The factor
analysis is described in the table below.
Due to this association between variables, the ideal thing to do is a factor
analysis. According to Hair et. al. (2005, p. 89), “ factor analysis can be utilized
to examine the underlying patterns or relationships for a large number of vari-
ables and to determine whether the information can be condensed or summa-
rized in a smaller set of factors or components.” This type of analysis is a
multivariate technique of statistical methods, whose purpose is to define the un-
derlying structure in a data matrix (Hair et. al. 2005, p. 91). The independent
variables also follow the same correlation pattern as shown below. The extrac-
tion method is that of principal components with varimax rotation with 25 inter-
actions by convergence. The factor was saved by a regression method whose
variable will be standardized, as will be seen later.
Figueiredo Filho & Silva Júnior (2010) didactically establish three stages of
planning a factor analysis. First, there are four assumptions to be satisfied: 1)
minimum number of cases between 50 and 100 and the ratio of 5 cases for each
variable. Although there are not 100 cases, which, according to Hair et. al.
(2005), would be ideal for a more robust result, the ratio between the number of
cases and the number of variables must be greater than five to one. Thus, with
29 events and three variables, this assumption was satisfied. 2) the correlation
coefficients between the variables must be above 0,30. For both correlation ta-
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Table 1 - Statistical Description of Variables
N Min Max Mean Standard deviation
iSTF 71 39 137 78.70 36.519
LJI 65 0.0798 0.6378 0.4028 0.18106
XCONST 65 0 6 4.06 2.157
XCONST_cat 65 1 3 2.31 0.934
Competição Política 69 1 9 6.12 3.183
NEP 71 1.66 13.45 5.2873 3.20177
NMP 71 1 9 3.06 2.833
F (Rae) 71 0.501 0.956 0.8173 0.18145
Poliarquia 71 0.150 0.892 0.5345 0.28160
Regime 71 0 1 0.68 0.471
N Valid (listwise) 64
Source: The authors with data from Barbosa 2015, Linzer & Staton 2015 and Coppedge et. al. 2017a.




























Table 2 - Pearson’s Correlation Matrix Between Dependent and Independent Variables
Dependent Variables Independent Variables




iSTF 1 0.590** 0.631** 0.501** 0.873** 0.926** 0.421** 0.894** 0.466** 0.680** 0.862**
65 65 65 71 71 71 71 71 69 69
LJI 1 0.899** 0.849** 0.658** 0.490** 0.650** 0.842** 0.781** 0.887** 0.808**
65 65 65 65 65 65 65 64 64
XCONST 1 0.975** 0.735** 0.542** 0.789** 0.880** 0.932** 0.966** 0.905**
65 65 65 65 65 65 64 64
XCONST_cat 1 0.641** 0.436** 0.809** 0.788** 0.939** 0.930** 0.827**
65 65 65 65 65 64 64
NEP 1 0.834** 0.671** 0.896** 0.628** 0.772** 0.944**
71 71 71 71 69 69
NMP 1 0.394** 0.775** 0.410** 0.591** 0.811**
71 71 71 69 69
F 1 0.661** 0.801** 0.796** 0.802**
71 71 69 69
Polyarchy 1 0.758** 0.914** 0.966**
69 69








Source: The authors with data from Barbosa 2015, Linzer & Staton 2015 and Coppedge et. al. 2017a.
** The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.

























Table 3 - Pearson’s Correlation Matrix with Disaggregated Judicial Variables and Political and Party Fragmentation





















1 0.910** 0.980** 0.889** 0.867** 0.892** 0.819** 0.683** 0.976** 0.909** 0.970**
71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 69 69
Compliance with Ju-
diciary
1 0.851** 0.832** 0.860** 0.807** 0.847** 0.481** 0.850** 0.748** 0.847**
71 71 71 71 71 71 71 69 69
Compliance with
High Court
1 0.823** 0.800** 0.843** 0.748** 0.671** 0.972** 0.912** 0.942**
71 71 71 71 71 71 69 69
High Court Inde-
pendence Index
1 0.946** 0.890** 0.898** 0.534** 0.842** 0.681** 0.868**
71 71 71 71 71 69 69
Lower Court Inde-
pendence Index
1 0.856** 0.928** 0.470** 0.803** 0.638** 0.834**
71 71 71 71 69 69
NEP 1 0.834** 0.671** 0.896** 0.772** 0.944**
71 71 71 69 69
NMP 1 0.394** 0.775** 0.591** 0.811**
71 71 69 69
F 1 0.661** 0.796** 0.802**
71 69 69









Source: The authors with data from Barbosa 2015 and Coppedge et. al. 2017a.
**. The correlation is significant at the 0.01 (bilateral) level.
bles, it is clear that this assumption was also satisfied. 3) the Kaiser-Meyer-
Olklin (KMO) test, which varies between 0 and 1 (the closer to 1, the better).
For Hair et. al. 2005, a KMO of 0.50 is considerably acceptable. 4) Bartlett’s
Test of Sphericity (BTS) must have a p value < 0.05. Table 4, below, shows the
coefficients of these two tests both in relation to the dependent variables and in
relation to the independent variables (Table 4).
Having overcome this first stage of satisfaction of the assumptions, the sec-
ond is centered on the factor extraction technique: main components, main fac-
tors, image factorization, maximum likelihood factorization, alpha factori-
zation, unweighted least squares and least squares (Figueiredo Filho & Silva
Júnior 2010, p. 167). The authors show that both principal component analysis
(PCA) and factor analysis (PA) “seek to produce linear combinations of vari-
ables that capture as much of the variance of the observed variables as possible”
(Figueiredo Filho & Silva Júnior 2010, p. 167). Regarding the best technique,
the authors show that
For Garson 2009, “principal component analysis is generally preferred for data
reduction purposes (translating the space of variables into an optimal factor
space), while factor analysis is generally preferred when the objective of the re-
search is to detect the structure data or causal modeling ”. According to Hair et
al., 2006, in most cases both the ACP and the AF reach the same results if the
number of variables exceeds 30 or if the communalities exceed 0.60 for most
variables. This article will use the principal component method as it is the most
used PALLANT, 2007. (Figueiredo Filho & Silva Júnior 2010, p. 167, our own
translation).
The technique used in this research to reduce these two categories of vari-
ables to two factors is that of principal components, by which the total amount
of variance that an original variable shares with all other variables included in
the analysis is measured. The issue now becomes the number of factors (Ta-
ble 5).
Here the researcher faces a trade off between parsimony and explanation. The
more factors are extracted, the lower the degree of parsimony, however, the
greater the total amount of variance by the factors. On the other hand, the less
factors are extracted, the greater the degree of parsimony, however, the smaller
the total amount of variance carried by the factors. Thus, the optimal solution is
to identify the minimum number of factors, which maximizes the amount of total
explained variance. (Figueiredo Filho & Silva Júnior 2010, p. 168, our own
translation).
According to these authors, the eigenvalue rule (Kaiser’s criterion) sug-
gests that only factors with eigenvalue above 1 should be extracted, since “the
factor with low eigenvalue is contributing little to explain the variance in the
original variables” (Figueiredo Filho & Silva Júnior 2010, p. 168, our own
translation). For them, the second stage of the factor analysis planning must
follow by: 1) type of extraction (which, in the case of this work, is that of the
main components); 2) Kaiser’s rule, where only factors with eigenvalue above
1 must be extracted; 3) the accumulated variance must be above 60%. The fol-
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Table 4 - Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Test (KMO) and Bartlett’s Sphericity Test




Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) 0.728 0.716
BTS 0.000 0.000
Source: The authors with data from Barbosa 2015 and Coppedge et. al. 2017a.
lowing tables summarize this data for both dependent and independent vari-
ables (Table 6).
Below we show the relationship between the factored variables and the
other independent variables. It is possible to verify, therefore, that the relation
of a single dependent variable factored with the other independent variables
has not been much altered, allowing the use of a simple linear model (OLS)
(Table 7).
IV. Formal models and data analysis
Due to the nature and distribution of variables, to test the hypothesis that the
greater the party fragmentation, the greater the judicial empowerment, two in-
ferential statistical techniques were adopted: the negative binomial, which is
part of the generalized linear models and the minimal classic ordinary squares
(OLS) of simple linear models. The choice of technique was due to the distribu-
tion of the dependent variable, which in this case violates the rules of the linear
model, the main one being the normal distribution. The generalized linear mod-
els seek to face variables that do not have a normal distribution, more precisely,
they seek to meet typical distributions of counts. Several studies give theoretical
support to the generalized linear models, especially those of Nelder & Wedder-
burn 1972, Feigl & Zelen 1965, Berkson 1944, and Dyke & Petterson 1952.
The dependent variables are in the first line, followed by the techniques
used. The independent variables are in the first column on the left. Three models
(in parentheses) were made for each technique. The first model is the unre-
stricted one, with all independent variables to verify multicollinearity and to
seek a more adjusted, more parsimonious model, which we call model 2, where
only the variables that resisted the multicollinearity test (VIF - Variance Infla-
tion Factor) were maintained. The third model, on the other hand, necessarily
has the indicator of political party fragmentation as the only independent vari-
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Table 6 - Description of factored variables
N Min Max Mean Standard deviation
Judicial Indicator from the V-DEM 71 -1.17919 1.97663 0 1
Fragmentation Indicator 69 -1.44771 1.65899 0 1
Source: The authors with data from Barbosa 2015 and Coppedge et. al. 2017a.
Table 5 - Eigenvalues* (Kaiser’s Criteria for the use of factorial analysis)
Judicial Indicator from the V-DEM Fragmentation Indicator
Components Initial Eigenvalues Components Initial Eigenvalues
Total % of variance Cumulative % Total % of variance Cumulative %
1 4.504 90.073 90.073 1 3.97 79.405 79.405
2 0.286 5.719 95.792 2 0.667 13.331 92.736
3 0.156 3.123 98.915 3 0.227 4.531 97.267
4 0.048 0.954 99.869 4 0.105 2.091 99.358
5 0.007 0.131 100 5 0.032 0.642 100
Source: The authors with data from Barbosa 2015 and Coppedge et. al. 2017a.
* Based on Garson (2009), the greater the eigenvalue, the greater the explanatory contribution of the variance of the variables,
that is, the greater the eigenvalue, the greater the variance load that the factor accumulates.
able, through factor analysis of the other independent variables. The models are
shown in the tables below, and after that we have the analyzes (Tables 8 and 9).
The data corroborate the hypotheses that the greater the political and party
fragmentation, the greater the tendency for the Judiciary to be empowered. For
the test of the iSTF indicator, the variables NMP and Political Competition
showed a positive impact on the indicator. As the values are exponentialized,
the interpretation is that the increase of one unit in the minimum number of par-
ties increases the chance of the Judiciary being strengthened by 11,43%. The in-
crease of one unit in political competition, on the other hand, increases the
chance of 3.93%. The fragmentation indicator is more complex, as it varies in
standard deviations. Therefore, the increase of a standard deviation in the indi-
cator produces a 45,46% chance increase in the iSTF indicator. The most intu-
itive is to stick with model two. In any case, both model 2 and model 3 show that
the greater the political and party fragmentation, the stronger the judiciary be-
comes.
For Linzer & Staton’s 2015 LJI (Latent Judicial Independence) variable test,
only one variable was statistically significant in the parsimonious model. As the
linear model is simple, an increase of one unit in political competition produces
an increase of 0.05 in the LJI unit, which ranges from 0.079 to 0.637. Model
three points out that the increase in a standard deviation in the fragmentation in-
dicator produces an increase of 0.1494 in the LJI. In both cases it is quite intu-
itive to say that, again, but with other forms of measurement for the judiciary,
the increase in fragmentation increases the indicators that measure the power of
the judiciary.
For the test of the XCONST variable, again only the political competition
variable was statistically significant, where the increase of one unit causes an in-
crease of 23,03% in the dependent variable that measures the level of embar-
rassment of the judiciary over the Executive. The fragmentation indicator points
to an increase of 53,21%.
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Table 7 - Pearson’s Correlation Matrix with factorized dependent variable
Indicator Judi-
cial (V-DEM)






1 0.904** 0.893** 0.599** 0.937** 0.819** 0.940**
71 71 71 71 69 69
NEP 1 0.834** 0.671** 0.896** 0.772** 0.944**
71 71 71 69 69
NMP 1 0.394** 0.775** 0.591** 0.811**
71 71 69 69
F 1 0.661** 0.796** 0.802**
71 69 69
Polyarchy 1 0.914** 0.966**
69 69
Political Competition 1 0.919**
69
Fragmentation Indicator 1
Source: The authors with data from Barbosa 2015 and Coppedge et. al. 2017a.

























Table 8 - Simple Linear (OLS) and Negative Binomial Regression Models
Dependent Variables iSTF LJI (Latent Judicial Independ-
ence Index)
XCONST Judicial Indicator (V-DEM)
[technique] [Negative Binomial] [MQO] [Negative Binomial] [MQO]
(model) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
NEP 0.9904 -0.0024** 0.9644 -0.0028
NMP 1.0504*** 1.1143*** -0.0081 -0.0025 0.9984 0.9799 0.1547*** 0.1480***
F 0.6515** 0.044 4.8309* 0.1135
Polyarchy 7.3364*** 0.5395*** 1.1236 2.0031*** 2.1717***
Political Competition 0.9365*** 1.0393*** 0.0263** 0.0508*** 1.1675** 1.2303*** 0.0134
Fragmentation Indicator 1.4546*** 0.1494*** 1.5321*** 0.9247***
Log Likelihood -227.214 -276.888 -291.784 -102.504 -104.314 -122.951
Pseudo R2 0.3291 0.1825 0.1385 0.2735 0.2607 0.1515
Prob. Chi2 1 0 0 0.497 0.499 0.5
R2 Ajustado 0.812 0.781 0.647 0.9486 0.946 0.8552
Prob. (F) 0 0 0 0 0 0
N 69 69 71 64 64 65 64 64 65 61 71 71
Source: The authors Barbosa data 2015 Coppedge et. al. 2017th and Linzer & Staton 2015.
** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01.
For the test of the factorized variable V-Dem Judicial Index, two variables
were statistically important: NMP and polyarchy. It means that the increase of
one unit in these variables increases by 0,1480 and 2,1717 standard deviations
in the dependent variable, respectively. The fragmentation indicator, on the
other hand, produces an increase of 0,9247 standard deviation. Then the test for
the variable XCONST categorized in 3 levels.
For the ordinal variable, the multinomial technique (mlogit in STATA) was
used and we chose the weak category to be the base result. In comparison to a
weak constraint, there is more likely to be a medium constraint if there is an in-
crease in party political fragmentation. There is even more likely to be a strong
constraint compared to the weak category. The marginal effects also showed
this. In the probit model, it reads practically the same way, there is a greater
probability of medium constraint and even greater in strong constraint, com-
pared with weak constraint, when a unit is increased in the dependent variable,
which, because it is factored, this unit corresponds to a standard deviation,
which is a very high value, but it is interesting to measure the impact (whether
positive or negative, and its intensity) (Table 10).
Table 10 shows the marginal effects after the multinomial logit model,
where it can be seen that the increase of one unit (standard deviation) in the frag-
mentation indicator, there is a 36,84% probability of having a strong constraint
from the Judiciary over the Executive. In the probit model, the marginal effects
are practically the same. There is a greater likelihood of a strong constraint com-
pared to a weak one, when increasing a unit in the independent variable.
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Table 9 - Multinomial Regression Model (logit and probit)
Independent Variables Fragmentation Indicator Fragmentation Indicator
[técnica] [Logit Multinomial] [Probit Multinomial]
XCONST_cat
weak(base category) - -
Medium 3.586** 2.6275***
Strong 4.7777*** 3.6622***
Log Likelihood -25.48 -25.383
Pseudo R2 0.5086
Prob. Chi2 0 0.0001
N 65 65
Source: The authors.
** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01.
Table 10 - Marginal Effects
Variable Fragmentation Indicator Dy/dx Standard Error P>|z|
logit Weak -0.3088 0.139 0.027
Medium -0.0595 0.078 0.446
Strong 0.3684 0.147 0.012
probit Weak -0.4007 0.145 0.006
Medium -0.0464 0.081 0.570
Strong 0.4471 0.147 0.002
Source: The authors.
IV.1 Interactive Terms20
The regime variable (1 = democracy, 0 = dictatorship) was used only to
measure the effect of party-political fragmentation on judicial empowerment in
the different types of regime faced by Brazil. Thus, the interactive term was cre-
ated from the independent variable that was shown to be statistically significant
in all of the above models, so we opted for the fragmentation indicator
(FragFac). The results of the fragmentation and regime interaction are shown in
the Table 11.
It is evident that, when the period is democratic, the impact of fragmentation
on judicial empowerment is even greater, and this is quite intuitive since dicta-
tors do not usually accept challenges, specially from within the three branches.
Although there was a discreet judicial empowerment during dictatorial periods,
the only actor with the capacity to file constitutional actions was the Attorney
General, with the free and exclusive appointment of the President of the Repub-
lic throughout the dictatorial regime, thus controlling the demands presented to
the Supreme Court. This is more evident in the graph below.
The image on the left shows the interaction of political fragmentation with
the regime impacting the iSTF indicator, while the image on the right shows the
impact of fragmentation on the V-Dem Judicial Index indicator. In both cases, it
is possible to verify the effect of the political regime on the empowerment of the
Judiciary. Finally, based on the data from Barbosa 2015, we verified a bank
with 23 constitutional amendments that modified the powers and prerogatives
of the Judiciary in the Brazilian constitutions from 1891 to 2013. The following
table organizes this information (Graph 4).
In relation to who contributed most to amend constitutional texts to em-
power the Judiciary, the following table of cross references summarizes the data
(Table 12).
Of the 22 amendments, the Executive was the author of 54,5%. In the dicta-
torial regime this participation was even greater, remembering that during the
dictatorial regime, the control ofABSTRACT constitutionality was the exclu-
sive authorship of the Attorney General, who was the exclusive and free nomi-
nation of the President of the Republic, having this total control over
theABSTRACT review. This shows that not only the Legislative, but mainly
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Table 11 - Impact of Fragmentation on Empowerment in different regimes (interactive terms)
Dependent Variable Regime iSTF Judicial Indicator (V-DEM)
[technique] [Negative Binomial] [MQO]
Interactive Term
Fragmentation Indicator 0 (dictatorship) 1.1177** 0.7130***








** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01.
20To see more about the
technique of interactive terms
see Brambor et. al. (2006).
the Executive had a lot of interest and initiative to increase the prerogatives of
the Judiciary.
V. Conclusions
If, in the resumption of democratic discussion in post-absolutism models
Parliament was the central institution, there is no doubt that in the post-war pe-
riod the Judiciary came to play a prominent role, especially in times of political
crisis, where political alignment (or necessary coalitions) had become a key
point for the proper functioning of democracies. There is no denying that today
the Supreme Courts have become a key player in the decision-making process,
given the inability of the elected powers to resolve political impasses. What was
in Montesquieu’s words “almost nothing”, or according to Aliomar Baleeiro
(1968) “an unknown”, became the Queen of a chess game.
In Brazil, this process, although consolidated by the 1988 Constitution, con-
tinued to evolve, giving the Supreme Federal Court the chance to exercise a de-
cision-making capacity not provided for in the constitutional text. The models
were forceful in demonstrating that party fragmentation has a positive and sta-
tistically significant impact on the increase in power of the Supreme Federal
Court and this impact is stronger in the democratic period when compared to the
dictatorial period. It was also proven that the increase in the power of the STF
was mainly due to constitutional amendments, of which the Executive was the
author of most. As previously mentioned, other variables may have a relative
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Source: The authors, based on Barbosa 2015.
Graph 4 - Marginal Effect of Political Fragmentation on Judicial Empowerment
Table 12 - Authorship and Regime by constitutional amendments from 1891 to 2013
Legislative Executive Total
Democracy 5 (50) 5 (50) 10 (100)
[50] [41.6]
Dictatorship 5 (41.6) 7 (58.4) 12 (100)
[50] [58.4]
Total 10 (45.5) 12 (54.5) 22 (100)
[100] [100] [100]
Source: The authors, based on data from Barbosa 2015.
Note: Lines frequencies are in parentheses and columns frequencies are in brackets.
weight in explaining specific decisions, such as the Courts’ own endogenous
decision-making dynamics, an exclusive source of self-empowerment.
The current moment of political crisis and the increasingly attentive eyes to
the decisions of the ministers of our supreme court corroborate the growing tra-
jectory of institutional empowerment, which authorizes the court to decide pe-
remptorily, and not only within the process of drafting public policies, but also
about the government’s own definition and the freedom of its members in-
volved in scandals. The impasses that the country is experiencing recently in-
crease the demand for decisions of the Supreme Federal Court. Therefore, the
solution that has been sought to circumvent (by-pass) the problems of party
fragmentation and political uncertainties is through the judicial system, as a
kind of insurance policy. And all of this happened with the support, consent and
silence of the incumbents.
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O Supremo Tribunal Federal como a rainha do jogo de xadrez: fragmentação partidária e empoderamento
judicial no Brasil
RESUMO Introdução: Este artigo analisa o processo de empoderamento do Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) do Brasil entre 1945 e
2015. O objetivo é explicar o que tornou o STF tão poderoso institucionalmente e como isso ocorreu. Estudos sobre a expansão global
do poder judicial apontam uma multiplicidade de causas para explicar esse fenômeno, mas pesquisas recentes vêm indicando a
fragmentação político-partidária como a principal causa do empoderamento judicial. O presente trabalho testa a hipótese de que
quanto maior a fragmentação partidária, mais poder institucional o STF possuirá. Materiais e Métodos: Como variável dependente, foi
criado um indicador sintético que mensura o poder institucional do Supremo Tribunal Federal ano a ano. As variáveis independentes
mensuraram anualmente a composição partidária da Câmara dos Deputados para o mesmo período. Além dessas variáveis, foram
importadas outras medidas da base de dados do V-Dem. Para essa análise foram utilizados modelos lineares simples, lineares
generalizados e multinomiais. Resultados: Foi identificado um alto impacto da fragmentação partidária no empoderamento
institucional do STF. Em todos os testes, a fragmentação partidária aumentou as chances de empoderamento institucional do Poder
Judiciário brasileiro. Discussão: As reformas exógenas que geraram esse empoderamento se deram com o apoio do Poder Executivo e
com a leniência do Poder Legislativo, transformando a Suprema Corte brasileira na Rainha do jogo de xadrez institucional nacional.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Poder Judiciário; fragmentação partidária; empoderamento judicial; Supremo Tribunal Federal; multinomial;
análise fatorial.
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